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Abstract 
 
 
 The rapid growth of substitutes for cash, particularly debit and credit cards, has 
led economists to predict the advent of the “cashless society”.  Yet cash holdings in most 
developed economies continue to grow and in the U.S., per capita currency holdings now 
amount to $3000. This paper revisits the long-standing controversy concerning the 
whereabouts of U.S. cash. Specifically, we employ a previously confidential data source 
on net shipments of U.S. currency abroad to re-estimate the fraction of U.S. currency held 
overseas. Contrary to the widely cited figure that 65 percent of U.S. currency is abroad, 
we now find that direct evidence supports the notion that overseas holdings amount to 
less than 25 percent. 
Currently, the official figure for the percent of U.S. currency held abroad as 
published by the Federal Reserve in their Flow of Funds Accounts and by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis in the U.S. Balance of Payments Accounts is 37 percent. This official 
figure is a proxy variable that is supposed to mimic the previously confidential data series 
maintained by the New York Federal Reserve. Judson (2012) made this series public 
enabling us to discover that the official estimates of currency abroad require downward 
revision to reflect accurately the newly released data on actual cash shipments abroad.  
We also review the “indirect” approaches to estimating the fraction of currency 
overseas employed by Porter and Judson (1996) and Judson (2012). We find that these 
indirect methods to be innovative but deeply flawed due to violations of their restrictive 
assumptions. Moreover, sensitivity analysis reveals the estimates highly sensitive to 
alternative specifying assumptions. We conclude that the large estimates of currency 
abroad obtained by these methods are spurious.  
 The paper also examines the temporal pattern of overseas holdings of U.S. 
currency and finds that the observed decline in the demand for U.S cash abroad coincides 
with the growing popularity of the Euro and its growth as a second currency held outside 
the Euro area between 2003 and 2008. These new findings have significant implications 
for estimating the domestic money supply and other domestic monetary aggregates; for 
estimating the net benefits of seigniorage earnings of the Federal Reserve; for forecasting 
changes in output and prices and for estimating the amount of unreported income and tax 
evasion in the U.S. 
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Introduction: The Currency Enigma 
 Over the past decades, we have witnessed a host of cash-saving financial 
innovations, leading to widespread predictions of the advent of the “cashless society”.  
However, contrary to these expectations, the demand for U.S. dollars continues to rise 
and we remain awash in cash. As revealed by Figure 1, by the end of 2011, U.S. currency 
in circulation with the public
2
 had risen to $1 trillion dollars, amounting to more than 
$3000 for every man, woman and child in the country. Over the last twenty years, real 
per capita currency holdings increased by 82 percent and currency as a fraction of the 
M1 money supply increased from 30 percent to 45 percent. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin-Madison. Contact 
elfeige@wisc.edu. The author gratefully acknowledges Roberto Coronado, Ruth Judson and Michael Mann 
for generously providing data employed in the study. This paper is an updated version of Feige (2012) 
employing newly acquired (previously confidential) data on recorded net shipments of U.S. currency 
overseas, released in graphic form in Hellerstein and Ryan (2011) and in Judson (2012). 
2
 The currency data used in the paper is the currency component of the M1 money supply defined as 
currency outside U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve Banks and the vaults of depository institutions. (Not 
seasonally adjusted). (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h6/hist/h6hist4.pdf) . The “currency outside 
banks” series from the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States Z.1 (Table L 204, line 6) (not 
seasonally adjusted) is typically somewhat larger than the currency component series. . 
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Figure 1 
Currency and Real Per Capita Currency 
Currency in Circulation (Left scale) Real Per capita Currency (Right scale) 
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  To put these figures in perspective, they imply that the average American’s 
bulging wallet holds roughly 91 pieces of U.S. paper currency, consisting of: 31 one 
dollar bills; 7 fives; 5 tens; 21 twenties; 4 fifties and 23 one hundred dollar bills. Few of 
us will recognize ourselves as “average” citizens. Clearly, these amounts of currency are 
not normally necessary for those of us simply wishing to make payments when neither 
credit/debit cards nor checks are accepted or convenient to use. Yet as shown in Figure 2, 
these surprisingly high U.S. per capita currency values were exceeded by per capita 
currency values for Europe ($3274); Hong Kong ($3963), Switzerland ($6335) and Japan 
($7562).   
 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements. 2010 Data. 
 
Federal Reserve surveys (Avery et al. 1986, 1987) of household currency usage 
found that U.S. residents admitted to holding less than 10 percent of the nation’s currency 
supply.  Businesses (Anderson, 1977; Sumner, 1990) admitted to holding only 5 percent.  
An even greater puzzle emerges from the Japanese Survey of Household Finances. In 
2007, Japanese households admitted to holding only 10 percent of the nation’s cash in 
circulation.
 3
 Yet Japan’s per capita currency holdings are two and a half times larger than 
those in the U.S. These surveys suggest that the whereabouts of 85 -90 percent of some 
                                                 
3
 Fujiki and Tanaka (2009) 
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Figure 2 
Per Capita Currency in Circulation with the Public  
 3 
nation’s currency supplies are unknown, suggesting that the “currency enigma” (Feige 
1989, 1994) is still very much with us. 
A growing body of evidence suggests that portions of some national currencies 
are held outside of the issuing country. Leung et. al. (2010) estimates that 50-70 percent 
of Hong Kong dollars circulate outside of Hong Kong and the European Central Bank 
(2011) estimates that 20-25 percent of euro banknotes circulate outside the euro area. The 
amount of Swiss currency in circulation outside of Switzerland is unknown and very few 
Japanese Yen circulate outside of Japan. The whereabouts of the U.S. currency supply is 
the key issue this paper seeks to address.  
 
2) The controversy over the location of U.S. currency. 
Research in the early nineties witnessed a number of studies attempting to 
estimate the fraction of U.S. currency held abroad, resulting in an empirical controversy 
that persists to this day.  Examining direct data sources 
4
 on net outflows of U.S. currency 
(Feige, 1994), and indirect methods, (variants of monetary demography models) Feige 
(1996) concluded, “that roughly 36 percent of U.S. currency is held abroad”. Examining 
the veracity of alternative methods of estimating overseas currency holdings, Feige 
(1997) suggested that the most plausible range of estimates was between 25-45 percent.  
Doyle (2000) subsequently estimated that in 1995, 30 percent of U.S. currency was 
abroad.  
Porter and Judson (1996) obtained very different results. Their main finding, 
based on an innovative, albeit fragile, indirect “seasonal” method was that 70 percent of 
the nation’s currency was abroad. Taking account of alternative estimation methods, 
Porter and Judson reported a “median flow estimate” for 1995 of 55 percent abroad, 
similar to the estimate produced by Anderson and Rasche (1997) of 53.2 percent.  Porter 
and Judson concluded, “that between 55 percent and 70 percent of the U.S. currency 
stock” was “held outside the country”.5  
Most recently, Feige (2012) revisited the question of how much of America’s 
currency was held abroad, and brought to light the fact that the Federal Reserve publishes 
                                                 
4
 These included both Currency and Monetary Instrument Reports (CMIR) and the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York’s (FSN) confidential wholesale currency bulk transport data. 
5
Porter and Judson (1996), p. 899. 
 4 
an “official” estimate of the amount of currency held abroad as part of its regular 
statistical reporting in its Flow of Funds Accounts.
6
 The U.S. Department of Commerce’s 
Bureau of Economic Analysis also employs this estimate and regularly publishes it in the 
U.S. Balance of Payments Accounts.
7
 The official Flow of Funds/Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (FOF/BEA) figure
8
 reveals that at the end of 2010, 37 percent of the nation’s 
currency supply held outside of banks was overseas ($342 billion) and the comparable 
estimate for 2011 was 39 percent or ($397 billion). Yet despite these official published 
figures, various Federal Reserve sources continue to cite the much higher figure reported 
in the fifteen-year-old Porter/Judson (1996) study.  For example: 
“Roughly 75 percent of hundred-dollar notes, 55 percent of fifty dollar notes, and 60 
percent of twenty-dollar notes are held abroad, while about 65 percent of all U.S. banknotes are 
in circulation outside the country. Approximately $580 billion in physical U.S. currency 
outstanding was circulating overseas at the end of March 2009” Goldberg (2010a) 
“More than 70% of hundred-dollar notes and nearly 60% of twenty- and fifty-dollar 
notes are held abroad, while two-thirds of all US banknotes have been in circulation outside the 
country since 1990” Goldberg (2010b) 
“The Federal Reserve estimates that as much as two-thirds of currency in circulation is 
held abroad.”  Roseman (2010) 
  “nearly two thirds of U.S. currency is held outside our borders.” Federal Reserve Bank 
of San Francisco (2012) 
“Recent estimates show that between one-half and two-thirds of the value of U.S. 
currency in circulation is held abroad.” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
(2012) 
One cannot readily dismiss the confusion caused by these paradoxical assertions 
since an accurate estimate of the fraction of U.S. currency held abroad and the frequency 
of its use (currency turnover) have important implications for a variety of economic 
issues. From the perspective of conducting domestic monetary policy, the relevant 
monetary aggregates to consider are the domestic money supply and the domestic 
monetary base (Feige, 1994). In order to determine the domestic monetary aggregates, the 
                                                 
6
 Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1 Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States. The estimated 
amount of U.S. currency held abroad appears on line 25 of Table L.204.   
7
 Bureau of Economic Analysis, (2008) 
8
 Federal Reserve Statistical Release Z.1 Flow of Funds Accounts, June 7, 2012, p.93. 
 5 
Federal Reserve needs to have an accurate estimate of the fraction of U.S. currency held 
abroad and the annual net outflow of U.S. currency going abroad. This knowledge is also 
required for operational decisions regarding the production, provision and maintenance of 
the U.S. currency supply. Similarly, foreign monetary authorities need to know the extent 
to which their nations are “de facto dollarized” (Feige et. al., 2003), and the magnitude of 
net inflows of foreign currencies into their economies. De facto dollarization reduces the 
effectiveness of exchange rate stabilization policies and reduces seigniorage revenues. 
The volatility of foreign demand for U.S. currency increases the difficulty of formulating 
appropriate domestic monetary policy.  
Accurate estimates of the amount of U.S. currency circulating abroad are also 
essential for calculating the net seigniorage benefit to U.S. taxpayers obtained by virtue 
of the fact that the U.S. government effectively obtains an interest free loan from 
foreigners holding U.S. dollars. According to the 2010 annual report of the Board of 
Governors, the Federal Reserve obtained $667 billion dollars in total seigniorage income 
between 1990 and 2010.  Domestic seigniorage earnings (based on the fraction of U.S. 
currency held at home) simply represent a redistribution of income from U.S. currency 
holders to U.S. taxpayers. On the other hand, seigniorage earnings on currency held 
abroad represent a net transfer of real resources from foreign currency holders to U.S. 
taxpayers. Based on official (FOF/BEA) estimates of overseas holdings, American 
taxpayers experienced a cumulative seigniorage windfall of $244 billion since 1990 from 
the overseas holdings of U.S. currency. However, based on the foregoing assertions of 
Federal Reserve officials who claim that two thirds of the U.S. currency supply was 
abroad during this period, we would conclude that U.S. taxpayers had obtained a 
cumulative seigniorage benefit of $434 billion since 1990. Discrepancies of this 
magnitude suggest that resolution of this empirical conflict requires serious attention. 
Feige (2012) demonstrates that accurate estimates of the fraction of U.S. currency 
held abroad also have important implications for assessing counterfeiting dangers; for our 
ability to forecast changes in prices and output; and for estimating the magnitude of the 
unreported economy and tax evasion. The widespread use of U.S. currency abroad 
increases the likelihood of counterfeiting, since foreign users are less familiar with the 
dollar than domestic users, making the passing of counterfeit notes abroad easier than at 
 6 
home. The whereabouts of America’s cash also has fiscal consequences. U.S. currency is 
a preferred medium of exchange for facilitating clandestine transactions, and for storing 
illicit and untaxed wealth. Knowledge of its location and usage is required to estimate the 
origins and volume of illicit transactions.  These include the illegal trade in drugs, arms 
and human trafficking as well as the amount of “unreported” income, that is, income not 
properly reported to the fiscal authorities due to noncompliance with the tax code. The 
fiscal revenue lost to the government creates a “tax gap” that measures the extent to 
which taxpayers do not pay the amount they legally owe to the Federal Government in a 
timely manner. The problem of tax evasion is even more salient in times of severe fiscal 
deficits. Improved tax compliance reduces fiscal deficits.  
 In short, our understanding of a number of key monetary and fiscal issues depends 
upon answers to two key empirical questions: 1) What fraction of the U.S. currency 
supply is held abroad and 2) how has the amount of U.S. currency held abroad changed 
over time?  Earlier answers to these questions have relied on two distinct approaches: 
direct measures of inflows and outflows of U.S. currency and indirect methods 
employing various versions of monetary demography models. 
9
 We first update earlier 
direct estimates of currency abroad with newly acquired direct source data on net bulk 
currency shipments overseas. This data has been reported to the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank by wholesale currency shippers since 1988 but was regarded as 
confidential until Judson (2012) recently released it. To anticipate our results, these 
newly released data suggest that only 25 percent of U.S. currency is abroad.  Further 
investigation of informal channels of currency flows abroad due to travel and immigrant 
remittances reinforces this conclusion.  
 We then reexamine the indirect approaches that were responsible for the initial 
Porter/Judson (1996) claim that between 55 and 70 percent of U/S. currency was held 
abroad. We find that some key assumptions of their monetary demography models are 
grossly violated by available information and that the results of the “seasonal” model are 
so sensitive to specifying assumptions as to raise serious doubts concerning their 
reliability. 
  
                                                 
9
 Feige (1996; 1997; 2012) presents detailed information concerning each of these approaches.  
 7 
3) Direct Measures of Net Currency Outflows Abroad 
A) Net bulk shipments of U.S. currency abroad 
 The most direct methods for estimating the faction of currency held abroad rely 
upon data systems designed to track currency outflows and inflows to and from abroad. 
Two such information systems are the U.S. Customs Service Currency and Monetary 
Instrument Reports (CMIR)
10
 and the New York Federal Reserve Bank’s (FSN) records 
of net international wholesale currency shipments abroad.
11
 The CMIR data is not longer 
readily available and their accuracy has been diminished since the mid 1990’s because of 
the establishment of Federal Reserve Extended Custodial Inventory (ECI) sites abroad.
12
  
As such, The New York Federal Reserve Bank’s data on net bulk shipments of U.S. 
currency abroad (FSN) are the best measure of net currency flows abroad.  
Specialist wholesale bulk banknote dealers handle most of the U.S. currency that 
flows into or out of the country and they report the amount, origin and destination of their 
currency shipments to the New York Federal Reserve. These bulk shippers satisfy the 
overseas demand for U.S. currency by overseas commercial banks that in turn make the 
U.S. currency available to exchange bureaus, firms and individuals abroad. Similarly, 
when overseas banks find themselves with excess U.S. currency, they return the 
banknotes to the U.S via wholesale banknote shippers and who report the transactions to 
the New York Federal Reserve Bank. Unfortunately, the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank has historically regarded this critical data set as confidential. As a result,  the 
official Federal Reserve Flow of Funds estimates of U.S. currency flows abroad 
13
 are 
based on a proxy variable (NYLAM) designed to mimic the confidential series (FSN) of 
net bulk shipments of U.S. currency. A recent paper by Judson (2012) presented at this 
conference, finally disclosed these previously confidential aggregate annual net currency 
shipments (FSN).   
                                                 
10
 Currently known as the Report of International Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments 
(FinCEN Form 105). 
11
 Both of these data systems are described, compared and evaluated in Feige (1996, 1997, 2012). 
12
 See Feige (2012) and Judson (2012) for an elaboration of the present deficiencies of the CMIR data. 
13
 Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts, Z.1 Table F -204  
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Figure 3 reveals that although the official Federal Reserve  (NYLAM) proxy is 
highly correlated (.87) with the actual recorded bulk shipment (FSN) data it attempts to 
mimic, between 1997 and 2010 the (NYLAM) proxy consistently overestimated actual 
net currency outflows. 
 
 
 Figure 4 shows that by 2011, the NYLAM proxy (which the Federal Reserve 
employed as its “official” published figure) estimated the cumulative amount of U.S. 
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Figure 3 
Actual recorded net bulk currency outflows (FSN)  and the Federal 
Reserve (NYLAM) proxy 
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Figure 4 
Estimated  Cumulative  Amount of U.S. Currency Held Abroad  
FSN (Actual Recorded) NYLAM (Proxy) 
 9 
currency overseas to be $397 billion, whereas the cumulative amount overseas estimated 
by the actual net bulk shipment series (FSN) amounted to only $252 billion. Moreover, 
the temporal pattern suggested by the two series is quite distinct. According to the actual 
reported FSN data, overseas demand for U.S. currency declined substantially between 
2003 and 2007 by roughly $50 billion and rose again in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2008. This pattern is entirely consistent with the findings of the European 
Central Bank (2011) and Augustin (2011), which suggest that the demand for Euros 
outside the euro area increased substantially during the period that the demand for dollars 
fell. In short, the decline in overseas demand for dollars is entirely consistent with the 
hypothesis that the euro was substituted for the dollar as a second currency in countries 
on the periphery of the euro area. Conversely, shipments of Euros to regions outside the 
euro area ceased to grow after 2008 while the demand for U.S. currency abroad resumed 
its upward trend, suggesting that U.S. currency replaced Euros in periphery countries 
because of the growing debt crisis in Europe. 
 
 
 
 Figure 5 displays the alternative estimated shares of U.S. currency held abroad. 
According to the “official” FOF/BEA published NYLAM proxy based figures, the share 
of U.S. currency held abroad remained within the narrow range of 35-40 percent between 
1994 and 2011. The newly released bulk shipment data (FSN) suggest that the share of 
currency held abroad peaked at 42 percent in 1997 and then fell dramatically to a low of 
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Figure 5 
Estimated share of U.S. currency held abroad 
FSN (Actual Recorded) NYLAM Proxy 
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19 percent in 2007, recently increasing to a share of 25 percent by the end of 2011. The 
dramatic in U.S. cash shipments to the former USSR and Argentina between 1989 and 
1997 and the equally dramatic fall in such shipments between 1997 and 2008 explains 
this pattern.
14
  
 To summarize, the newly released New York Federal Reserve data on recorded 
net bulk shipments of U.S. currency abroad indicate that the “official” FOF/BEA 
estimates of overseas currency based on the NYLAM proxy have overestimated the 
amount of U.S. currency abroad since 1998.  By 2011, it appears that $150 billion of U.S. 
cash previously believed to be abroad was in fact in circulation domestically. Moreover, 
the current share of U.S currency held abroad is closer to 25 percent than the officially 
published estimate of 40 percent. The recorded decline in the demand for U.S. currency 
abroad between 2002 and 2007 appears to be the result of euro substitution for the dollar 
in countries outside the euro area. 
 
B) Informal net flows of currency abroad due to travel and immigrant remittances 
The foregoing estimates of U.S. held abroad based on net bulk wholesale 
shipments are incomplete insofar as they do not reflect currency hand carried or mailed in 
to or out of the country by travelers or guest workers in the form of immigrant 
remittances.  They may also exclude some currency shipments into or out of the country 
by non-reporting shipping entities and may include errors due to some deliberate 
falsification of reports by bulk shippers. 
15
 However, we have no a priori way of knowing 
whether such omissions lead to an over or under estimate of the amount of currency held 
abroad.  
Judson (2012) makes the highly implausible claim that informal or “retail” 
channels of net U.S. currency outflows could exceed recorded wholesale net shipments 
(FSN) by more than $300 billion.
16
 If her “admittedly crude”17 approach were taken 
seriously, it would imply that 52-53 percent of U.S. currency is presently held abroad, 
                                                 
14
 See Judson (2012) Figure 8. 
15
 In 2003, the Federal Reserve terminated its Extended Custodial Inventory (ECI) agreement with UBS 
and in 2004 followed with a $100 million civil penalty after discovering that UBS had falsified its reports 
of overseas shipments to the Federal Reserve over an eight year period. (Pasley, 2005)   
16
 Judson (2012) Figure 11A.  
17
 Judson, (2012) p. 16. 
 11 
more than double the estimate based on the FSN data. Rather than attempt to directly 
estimate the impact of travel and immigrant remittances on the amount of U.S. cash held 
overseas, Judson arbitrarily selects a group of countries “known to have significant 
tourism or significant populations of immigrants or migrant workers in the United States” 
and “ a group of countries whose total net shipments is substantial and negative”.18  
Without identifying the countries she has thus selected, nor indicating the amounts of net 
shipments of cash to or from those countries, she simply assumes that the currency 
flowing back into the U.S. from each of these unspecified countries was zero. This is 
tantamount to simply throwing out over $300 billion dollars of net currency inflows 
reported to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York by bonded professional wholesale 
currency shippers. This “very rough adjustment” 19 is both arbitrary and implausible. 
Similarly, Judson’s use of the “adjusted shipment proxy series” lacks credibility since the 
Federal Reserve and the Bureau of Economic Analysis
20
 abandoned it fifteen years ago 
precisely because it took no account of reflows of currency known to be received by the 
Miami cash office from Latin America and from the Los Angles cash office from Asia. 
Judson’s general observation that “retail” or informal channels of currency flows 
may affect our estimates of the amount of U.S. currency held abroad is indisputable, as is 
her suggestion that the primary informal currency flows are likely to arise due to 
immigrant remittances and travel. The challenge is therefore to estimate the net size of 
these flows from the available evidence. 
 Estimates of immigrant remittances are obtained from the U.S. Balance of 
Payments records of “private remittances and other transfers”,21 a key component of 
which are remittances representing “personal transfers by foreign born population”. In 
order to estimate the fraction of these transfers made in cash, we rely on survey 
information provided by the Banco de Mexico of remittances by type of transfer 
payment.
22
 
 
                                                 
18
 Judson (2012) p. 15. 
19
 Judson (2012) p.15. 
20
 Bach (1997) 
21
 U.S. International Transactions Accounts: June 13, 2012 Table 1 Line 38. 
22
 I am indebted to Roberto Coronado of the San Francisco Federal Reserve for providing the data and 
necessary translations of the Banco de Mexico survey. 
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Source: Banco de Mexico 
 
 Figure 6 reveals that the vast majority of immigrant remittances are transferred by 
electronic means, which presently amount to 98 percent of all transfers. Cash payments, 
which in 1996 accounted for roughly 10 percent of all remittance transfers now account 
for just 1 percent. We obtain our annual estimate of total cash outflows of U.S. currency 
due to immigrant remittances by multiplying the personal transfers of foreign born by the 
fraction of remittances transferred in cash. We find that cumulative cash remittances 
made since 1988 amount to roughly 11 percent of cumulative wholesale shipments as 
recorded in the FSN data.  
The U.S Balance of Payment Accounts also records travel and tourism 
expenditures of inbound (exports) and outbound (imports) travelers. 
23
 Moreover, the 
Commerce Department’s Office of Travel and Tourism conducts annual surveys of 
overseas travelers to the U.S. and of U.S. resident travelers visiting overseas destinations. 
These inbound and outbound survey profiles include estimates of the fraction of total 
travel expenditures made in cash by incoming and outgoing travelers. We are therefore 
able to estimate the volume of cash expenditures made by inbound and outbound 
travelers. A sizable and growing portion of these cash expenditures are made with 
currency obtained from ATM machines or exchange bureaus in the destination country. 
                                                 
23
 The data source is U.S. Department of Commerce, (2012)  
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Remittances by type of payment 
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Assuming that foreign travelers to the U.S. bring U.S. currency into the country for 
twenty percent of their cash expenditures and American travelers going abroad make 
twenty percent of their cash expenditures with dollars taken out of the U.S. and, we can 
estimate the magnitude of informal “retail” inflows and outflows of U.S. currency due to 
travel. We find that the net effect of travelers transferring cash is to reduce the estimate of 
currency abroad since inbound travelers bring more cash into the country than outbound 
travelers take out.
24
  
 
 
 
Figure 7 summarizes our estimates of the amounts of U.S. currency held abroad 
taking account of both net wholesale shipments as reported to the New York Federal 
Reserve (FSN) and estimates of “retail” or informal channels of cash transfers arising 
from immigrant remittances and travel. By 2011, these direct measurements suggest that 
U.S. currency abroad amounts to roughly $230 billion, or 23 percent of the outstanding 
currency supply held by the public. The most significant conclusion resulting from our 
                                                 
24
 It should be noted that if we alternatively assume that inbound travelers pay 20 percent of their cash 
expenditures with U.S. currency obtained abroad and that U.S. travelers going overseas pay for 15 percent 
of their cash expenditures with dollars taken abroad, this reduces our estimate of overseas currency by an 
additional $20 billion. 
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Figure 7 
Estimated U.S. currency overseas: Wholesale and retail channels   
FSN FSN+Remittaces and Travel(20/20) 
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review of direct measures of overseas currency is that far less currency appears to be 
circulating overseas than was previously thought to be the case. 
 
  
 
Figure 8 compares the share of U.S. currency held abroad as measured by direct 
estimates of wholesale and retail cash flows to the “official” published FOF/BEA 
estimates that relied on the NYLAM proxy. It appears that from 1987-1998, the NYLAM 
proxy underestimated the share of currency abroad, whereas in the most recent decade, 
the proxy appears to have overestimated the share of currency abroad. The direct 
measurement approach reveals that the share abroad rose abruptly from 23 percent in 
1987 to a high of 43 percent in 1997 and then subsequently declined reaching a low point 
of 18 percent at the end of 2007.  Note that both series suggest that the amount of 
currency held abroad was significantly less than the oft-cited claim that between 55 to 70 
percent of U.S. currency was abroad. We now turn to an investigation of the indirect 
methods of estimating overseas currency that are the basis of this latter claim.  
 
4) Indirect Measures of Currency Abroad 
A) The simple monetary demography model. 
 A simple indirect means of estimating currency abroad employs some variant of 
the monetary demography model
25
.  The monetary demography model (MDM) basically 
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 Feige (1996,1997) 
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Figure 8 
Direct and proxy estimates of share of currency abroad  
FSN+Travel+Remittances "Official" FOF/BEA (NYLAM Proxy) 
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assumes that any observed characteristic of the U.S. currency supply (X) can be 
decomposed into an unobserved domestic component (X
d
) and an unobserved foreign 
component (X
f 
) such that X= X
d + 
X
f 
.  Now assume that there exists a country very 
similar to the U.S. (say Canada) except that it must neither import foreign currency nor 
export its own currency to other countries. Since its own currency is assumed to have no 
foreign characteristic, Y might then be assumed to behave like the domestic component 
of the U.S. currency supply such that, Y≈ Xd .  
Then, if X = Y + Xf ,  one can obtain an estimate of the unobserved fraction of X 
made up by its foreign component since, X
f
/X = 1- Y/X. Often some observable 
Canadian characteristic related to Canadian currency is taken to represent the comparable 
unobserved domestic characteristic of the U.S currency supply. For example, we can 
consider the currency/GDP ratio (Judson, 2012), currency per capita, or the ratio of 
currency to wages and salaries (WS) as possible characteristics.
26
  
 
 
 
Figure 9 presents the results of some simple variants of the MDM model.
27
 First, 
we note that the temporal path is highly sensitive to the particular characteristic chosen; 
hence, the estimates are not robust to simple changes in the model specification. The 
                                                 
26
 Feige (1996, 1997), Porter, and Judson (1996) also employ age, note quality, coin/note ratios and 
seasonal characteristics. 
27
 Judson (2012) p.11-12 obtains similar results. 
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Simple indirect MDM estimates of the share of U.S. currency abroad 
Cur/GDP Cur/POP Cur/WS 
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results also suggest that 46 percent of U.S. currency is currently overseas, roughly double 
the figure obtained by the direct estimation procedure. 
This discrepancy is likely due to a serious violation of one of the key assumptions 
underlying the simple MDM model, namely, that Canada does not import any foreign 
currency. If for example, Canadians at various times employed U.S. dollars as a 
substitute currency, this would violate the assumption that Y≈ Xd, because the observed 
Canadian currency supply would be abnormally small, resulting in an overestimate of the 
share of U.S. currency held abroad (X
f
/X). Murray and Powell (2002) present evidence 
that demonstrates that this key assumption is violated.   
“CMIR data suggest that the amount of U.S. dollars in circulation at their peak in 
1994 was more than 30 percent of the outstanding stock of Canadian notes and 
coin in circulation.” (P.23) “Fed data for 1990-2001 generally corroborate the 
CMIR data, although the cumulative net inflows are roughly double those of the 
CMIR” (p. 21)  
 
 
 
Figure 10 displays the extent of the use of U.S. dollars in Canada based on the 
actual CMIR and Federal Reserve (FSN) data for the period 1980 – 1997. According to 
the CMIR data, by 1994, U.S. currency amounted to 38 percent of Canadian currency in 
circulation, whereas the FSN data suggest that this percentage had risen to 57 percent by 
1997. The fact that between 28 and 36 percent of all currency in circulation (U.S. plus 
0.0 
10.0 
20.0 
30.0 
40.0 
50.0 
60.0 
P
e
rc
e
n
t 
Figure 10 
U.S. dollars in circulation in Canada as percent of Canadian currency 
in circulation 
CMIR FSN 
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Canadian) was in the form of U.S. dollars implies a gross violation of the key 
assumptions of the MDM models and hence makes the results presented in Figure 9 and 
the similar ones presented by Judson (2012) highly suspect. Since neither the CMIR data 
nor the FSN data are available on a country basis for the period of the past decade, it is 
impossible to tell whether the demand for U.S. currency increased or decreased during 
this period. 
B) The “seasonal” variant of the monetary demography model. 
 At the outset, it is important to note that the repeated assertions that as much as 
two thirds of the U.S. currency supply circulates abroad is almost entirely based on the 
results reported by Porter and Judson (1996) derived from the “seasonal” variant of the 
monetary demography model. The seasonal variant of the monetary demography model 
requires a set of highly restrictive assumptions.  Porter and Judson (1996) and Judson 
(2012) assume that: 
 1) “the seasonal amplitude, or the percentage difference between the seasonal peak and 
trough of the domestic demand for U.S. currency is virtually identical to the demand 
within Canada for Canadian dollars”; 
 2) “that the foreign demand for U.S. dollars has no significant seasonal pattern, or 
correspondingly, that the seasonal amplitude for the foreign component of demand for 
U.S. dollars is zero”; 
 3) “that the circulation of Canadian dollars outside of Canada is negligible.”  
 4) “that U.S. currency is not used to a substantial degree inside Canada.” 
 As demonstrated in section 3A above, the fourth assumption is grossly violated, 
thereby invalidating empirical results based on it. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Feige 
(1997, p 91) the estimation procedure is highly arbitrary, and the results can fluctuate 
substantially depending upon which seasonal metric is employed.  
Figure 11 illustrates the sensitivity of the seasonal results to alternative 
specifications concerning which seasonal characteristic the researcher chooses to employ. 
The first estimate labeled (Porter/Judson (1996) [Dec-Feb] is simply an updating of the 
seasonal model originally proposed and estimated by Porter/Judson (1996) employing the 
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difference between the December and February seasonal. 
28
 This seasonal model suggests 
that in 2011, $790 billion of U.S. currency was abroad, 79 percent of the total U.S. 
currency in circulation. 
   
 
 
Judson (2012) finds that the seasonal trough has shifted from February to 
September but changes the model’s specification to the difference between the December 
and January seasonal. The results are charted in Figure 11 (labeled Judson (2012) [Dec-
Jan]. This alternative specification reduces the estimated amount of U.S. currency abroad 
by $170 billion, and lowers the share abroad to 64 percent. However, had Judson 
employed the same criterion for choosing the seasonal characteristic as used in the 1996 
paper, namely the difference between the seasonal peak and the seasonal trough, she 
would have calculated the model employing the difference between the December peak 
and the new September trough. Figure 11 also displays these results (labeled Seasonal 
[Dec–Sept]). Not only does this seemingly minor modification drastically change the 
entire estimated temporal pattern of the estimates, it lowers the estimated amount of U.S. 
currency abroad to $368 billion, or to 37 percent of the U.S. currency supply.  
 
                                                 
28
 Porter and Judson (1996) claim that the “best estimate of the model is obtained by measuring the 
seasonal variation around Christmas, specifically from the seasonal high that is reached in currency in 
December to the seasonal low in February.”  
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Figure 11 
Alternative seasonal model estimates of U.S. currency abroad 
Porter/Judson (1996) [Dec-Feb] Judson(2012) [Dec-Jan] Seasonal [Dec-Sept] 
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The sensitivity of the share results to minor alternative specifications of the seasonal 
model are displayed in Figure 12. Given the radical changes in both the temporal pattern 
and the magnitude of the estimated shares resulting from these alternative specifications 
of the model, we conclude that this indirect approach is unfit for estimating the share of 
U.S. currency abroad. This conclusion is bolstered by the empirical finding that one of 
the key assumptions of the model is violated  namely that U.S. currency is not used inside 
Canada. 
 
5) Summary and Conclusions 
 Even a cursory examination of the growth and magnitude of the U.S. currency 
supply in circulation with the public reveals that predictions of the advent of the “cashless 
society” are unfounded. Despite financial innovations giving rise to convenient 
substitutes for cash, per capita cash holdings continue to increase and by the end of 2011, 
amounted to $3000 for every man woman and child residing in the U.S. While this figure 
does not comport with our common sense notion of how many dollars the average person 
holds in her wallet, we show that Europeans and Japanese citizens hold even larger 
amounts of cash. Two explanations are offered for these large cash holdings. The first 
posits that a large fraction of U.S. currency is held abroad, the second that large amounts 
of cash are employed to undertake transactions that individuals and firms prefer to hide 
from the government either to avoid taxes, regulations or punishment for illegal activities. 
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Figure 12 
Estimated share of U.S. currency abroad: Seasonal model sensitivity 
analysis 
Porter/Judson (1996) [Dec-Feb] Judson(2012) [Dec-Jan] Seasonal [Dec-Sept] 
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Cash, being an anonomous medium of exchange leaving no paper trail, is the logical 
choice for undertaking such transactions. 
Feige(2012) employed the official estimates
29
 (FOF/BEA) of the amount of U.S. 
currency believed to be overseas, to derive estimates of U.S. seiniorage earnings, the 
domestic money supply, and estimates of the unreported economy and the “tax gap”. This 
official FOF/BEA estimate of the share of U.S. currency abroad is based on a proxy 
measure (NYLAM) that was designed to mimic a confidential data series controlled by 
the New York Federal Reserve (FSN) that tracks bulk shipments of wholesale currency 
dealers into and out of the U.S. This confidential aggregate shipment data was recently 
published in a paper by Judson (2012), enabling researchers to reexamine the veracity of 
the official FOF/BEA (NYLAM) proxy estimates of the amount of U.S. currency held 
abroad. 
 
 
As displayed in Figure 13, the NYLAM proxy appears to track the formerly 
confidential FSN series reasonalby closely between 1988 and 2001, after which time the 
proxy begins to substantially overstate the series it is supposed to mimic. By 2011, the 
official FOF/BEA (NYLAM) estimate of overseas currency is roughly $150 billion larger 
than the amount reported to the New York Federal Reserve (FSN) by wholesale bulk 
                                                 
29
 As published by the Federal Reserve in its Flow of Funds Accounts and by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis in the U.S. Balance of Payment Accounts. 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
D
o
lla
rs
 (
B
ill
io
n
s)
 
Figure  13  
Alternative estimates of currency abroad  
FSN (Actual Recorded) FSN+Remittances + Travel 
NYLAM (Proxy) Average MDM 
Porter Judson(1996) Judson (2012) 
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shippers of currency. Judson (2012) suggests that the the FSN series may be an 
understatement of the amount of U.S. currency abroad because it omits net currency 
shipments abroad through informal channels such as immigrant remitances and travel. 
We therefore directly estimate cash flows through these informal channels and find that 
taking account of immigrant remitances and cash transported by inbound and outbound 
passengers leads to a slight increase in our estiamte of U.S. cash held abroad between 
1988 and 2002. Thereafter,  informal flows reduce our estimates of currency abroad. We 
conclude that by the end of 2011, the best direct estimates of U.S currency held abroad 
suggest that $230 billion is held overseas, that is 23 percent of the currency in circulation 
with the public. This estimate implies that per capita domestic cash holdings amount to 
roughly $2300. We strongly suggest that the Federal Reserve and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis downward revise their official estimates of overseas currency to 
bring them into conformity with the New York Federal Reserves (FSN) series and the 
available estimates of immigrant remittances and travel flows.  
 We then turn to a reexamination of  “indirect” means of estimating the amount of 
U.S. currency abroad. These indirect methods, based on varients of monetary 
demography models, are the basis for the oft cited claims, that as much as 55 -70 percent 
of the nation’s currency supply is held overseas. While these indirect methods are 
admittedly innovative, we demonstrate that they require highly restrictive assumptions 
which can be shown to be significantly violated by available empirical data. Figure 13 
reveals that an average of simple monetary demography models suggests that  $470 
billion of U.S. currency (47 percent) is currently held abroad. We also update the 
“seasonal” models proposed by Porter and Judson (1996) and Judson (2012) also 
displayed in Figure 13.  If taken at face value, they suggest that between $620 - $790 
billon (62-79 percent) of U.S. currency is held abroad. As such, the indirect approaches  
produce estimates exceeding the direct estimates by an astounding $390-550 billion. 
They also suggest a temporal path at variance with that of direct estimates. The direct 
estimates reveal that the introduction of the Euro led to a substitution of Euros for U.S. 
dollars until the financial crisis. The seasonal models suggest a continual upward trend in 
the demand for U.S. dollars abroad. We not only demonstrate that a key assumption 
underlying these indirect models is false but also show that the results from these models 
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are highly sensitive to slight variations in their specifying assumptions. We conclude that 
these indirect models, particularly the seasonal models, are unfit as measures of the 
amount of U.S. currency held abroad.  
 It is beyond the scope of the present paper to examine many of the interesting 
implications that follow from our finding that the amount of currency overseas is less 
than 25 percent of the nation’s cash in circulation with the public. We do however 
strongly urge Federal Reserve officials to come to some agreement concerning the 
amount of currency held abroad so that the current discrepancies between their published 
data, their internal data and their public pronouncements can finally be put to rest. 
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